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WHAT IS MARRIAGE-LIKE LIKE? THE
IRRELEVANCE OF CONJUGALITY
Brenda Cossman* & Bruce Ryder**
While the notion of conjugal or marriage-like has become
legally ubiquitous in the regulation of non-marital cohabitation
in Canada, its meaning remains elusive. A review of the case
law and of spousal definitions in income security schemes
reveals that the presence or absence of a sexual component to
a relationship has become immaterial to, or of declining
relevance in, the determination of conjugality. As a result,
legal decision-makers have had to grapple with the increasing
instability of the distinction between conjugal and non-
conjugal relationships.
The question of whether a relationship has a sexual
component bears no relation to legitimate state objectives. As a
result, the distinction between conjugal and non-conjugal
relationships is collapsing as a coherent basis for legal policy.
It thus becomes necessary to develop better ways of
determining when and how adult personal relationships ought
to be recognized in the law. Rather than continuing on the
elusive quest for marriage equivalence, it is necessary to
reformulate relational definitions to focus more precisely on
the kinds of emotional and economic interdependence relevant
to the objectives ofparticular laws.
I. INTRODUCTION
Definitions of common law spouses or partners in Canadian
statutes tend to require cohabitation in a "conjugal" or
* Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto.
Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.
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"marriage-like" relationship. As a result, a number of legal
consequences turn on the distinction between conjugal and
non-conjugal relationships. These include benefits or rights,
such as the right to claim family employment benefits, the right
to claim the spousal or common law partner tax deduction, the
right to death benefits or survivors' pensions, the right to
inherit property when a loved one dies intestate, the right to
bring a claim for losses consequent upon the wrongful death or
injury of a loved one, and the right to sponsor a common law
partner for immigration purposes. Financial penalties may also
flow from recognition as a common law spouse or partner. A
low-income person deemed to be living in a conjugal
relationship may find his or her entitlement to benefits reduced
or eliminated pursuant to a variety of federal and
provincial/territorial income security schemes. Likewise,
whether a person has certain obligations, like spousal support
obligations or a duty to provide the necessaries of life to a
cohabitant, depends on the distinction between conjugal and
non-conjugal relationships.
Given the heavy legal freight the notion of conjugality
has been asked to bear, one would think it would have been
thoroughly investigated and its meaning clearly understood.
Yet, while debates have raged over the question of who the law
should consider to be a spouse, the definition of conjugality
remains elusive. Until recently, it has received little critical
attention. The academic literature increasingly emphasizes the
diversity of family forms beyond the conjugal relationship.' In
sociological terms, family is increasingly defined by functions
and practices - what people do in their personal relationships -
E. de Silva & C. Smart, eds., The New Family? (London: Sage,
1999). For a critique of the ways in which a sexual tie between adults
dominates our thinking about family policy, see M. Fineman, The
Neutered Mother, The Sexual Family and Other Twentieth Century
Tragedies (New York: Routledge, 1995).
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rather than by the formal status of relationships.2 Despite the
emphasis on the diversity of familial practices, the definition of
the conjugal relationship itself is rarely interrogated.3
2 See B. Cossman & J. Fudge, "Introduction to Privatization, Law and
the Challenge to Feminism", in B. Cossman & J. Fudge, eds.,
Privatization, Law and the Challenge to Feminism (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, forthcoming 2002); "Profiling Canada's
Families I' (May 2000) at v, online: Vanier Institute of the Family
Homepage <http://www.vifamily.ca/pubs> (last modified 31 July
2000) (defining family as people bound by ties of mutual consent,
birth, adoption or placement who assume responsibilities for variant
combinations of care; procreation; socialization of children; social
control of members; production, consumption and distribution of
goods and services; and affective nurturance).
See W. Holland, "Intimate Relationships in the New Millennium:
The Assimilation of Marriage and Cohabitation?" (2000) 17 Can. J.
Fam. L. 114 at 122: "Surprisingly, though, little attention has actually
been focused on the very nature of marriage itself, and fundamental
questions about its nature and function go unanswered and continue
to surface in a number of contexts." Examining the relevance of
conjugality in framing federal legislative policies is a central aspect
of the Law Commission of Canada's work on adult personal
relationships. See the Commission's discussion paper, Beyond
Conjugality: Recognizing and Supporting Close Personal Adult
Relationships (Ottawa: Law Commission of Canada, 2001), online:
Law Commission of Canada Website <http://www.lcc.gc.ca/en/
themes/pr/cpra/report.html> (last modified 31 January 2002). For
other work that does devote critical attention to legal definitions of
spouse and conjugality, see S. Gavigan, "Paradise Lost, Paradox
Revisited: The Implications of Feminist, Lesbian and Gay
Engagement to Law" (1993) 31 Osgoode Hall L.J. 589; S. Gavigan,
"Legal Forms, Family Forms, Gendered Norms: What is a Spouse?"
(1999) 14 Canadian Journal of Law and Society 127; T. Barclay,
"Peering into the Bedrooms of the Province: An Examination of the
Different Definitions of 'Spouse' in the Family Law Act and the
Ontario Works Act, 1997" (2000) 15 Journal of Law and Social
Policy 1, online: Legal Aid Ontario website <http://www.legalaid.
on.ca/journal /Barclay.pdf>; B. Cossman & B. Ryder, Gay, Lesbian
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In this paper, we pursue a series of questions about
conjugality that have become more important as the notion has
spread across our statute books. What are conjugal or marriage-
like relationships like? What distinguishes them from other
adult personal relationships, and why should the distinction
matter? Should conjugality remain a marker for the allocation
of rights and responsibilities? Is the distinction normatively and
legally viable?
We argue that the more the notion of conjugality is
interrogated, the more it becomes apparent that it is an
irrational basis for the allocation of legal benefits and burdens.
We begin by reviewing the recent legislative developments in
response to the constitutional rulings requiring equal treatment
of conjugal relationships. At the federal level and in each
provincial/territorial jurisdiction, an array of legal rights and
obligations are now imposed on persons who cohabit in
conjugal or marriage-like relationships. Constitutional
challenges and the ensuing legislative reforms have been
animated by a drive towards formal equality. Persons in
relationships deemed equivalent to marriage have increasingly
been accorded the same rights and responsibilities as married
couples. The extension of rights and responsibilities to
unmarried cohabitants - both same-sex and opposite-sex alike
- has used conjugality as the appropriate marker for legal
inclusion through ascribed spousal status.
We then turn to a review of judicial approaches to the
definition of conjugality, culminating in a discussion of the
Supreme Court of Canada's comments on the issue in M v. H.
We critique the current uses and understandings of conjugality,
arguing that in the aftermath of M v. H., the distinction
and Unmarried Heterosexual Couples and the Family Law Act:
Accommodating a Diversity of Family Forms (Toronto: Ontario Law
Reform Commission, 1993) at 77-83.
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between conjugal and non-conjugal relationships has become
even more elusive. Sex, once the hallmark of a conjugal
relationship, has become legally less important, to the point
that the Supreme Court has suggested that a relationship may
be conjugal even if the individuals do not have a sexual
relationship.
We argue that sex is, or ought to be, totally irrelevant.
Taking sex into account at all is wrong-headed and offensive. It
is wrong-headed because whether a relationship has a sexual
component or not bears no relation to the achievement of
legitimate state objectives. It is offensive because it requires
cohabitants to disclose the details of the most intimate aspects
of their lives to administrators or in public proceedings.
We go on to review the expansive definitions of spouse
employed in the context of social assistance legislation, and
show how the distinction between conjugal and non-conjugal
relationships has been eroded and that erosion contested. In
addition to the uncertainties about whether co-residents are
caught within definitions of conjugal relationships, we will
show how the administration of the spousal regime to
unmarried couples entails significant negative consequences
for their privacy, autonomy and financial security.
We argue that these problems could be attenuated if
governments were to consider three general directions for law
reform. First, there is a need to reconsider legislative objectives
and the relevance of relationships to them. For example, social
welfare is an area where the objective of delivering benefits to
persons most in need could be accomplished more effectively if
the existence of a conjugal or any other relationship was not
used as a proxy for reduced need.
Second, legislatures should expand opportunities for
persons to voluntarily take on legal rights and responsibilities
by legalizing same-sex marriage and by enacting domestic
2001] 273
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partnership regimes that are not restricted to conjugal
cohabitants. The need to rely on the involuntary imposition of
spousal status would then be reduced, although not entirely
eliminated.
Third, definitions of ascribed spouses or common law
partners need to be reformulated. Conjugality should no longer
be the marker or proxy for the legal regulation of adult personal
relationships. The distinction is no longer normatively or
legally viable. The search for marriage-equivalence is a relic of
an era when the law sought to bolster and regulate marriage as
the only socially acceptable intimate relationship between
adults. Ironically, at the same time as lawmakers have
abandoned the view that marriage should be the only state-
sanctioned adult intimate relationship, they have extended the
use of marriage or marriage-like relationships to accomplish a
range of state policies.
Conjugality or marriage-equivalence is a poor proxy
for the relational attributes relevant to legislative objectives.
We argue that the law should more carefully tailor its
definitions of adult personal relationships to the underlying
objectives of state regulation. The law should avoid
presumptions based on relational status and focus more on the
actual existence of the kinds of economic and/or emotional
interdependence relevant to particular legislative objectives.
II. THE CENTRAL PLACE OF CONJUGALITY IN
STATUTORY DEFINITIONS OF COMMON LAW
SPOUSES OR PARTNERS
Canadian legislatures have gone much further than their
counterparts in many other jurisdictions in imposing legal
rights and responsibilities on unmarried couples. They have
done so by deeming cohabitants to be spouses or "common law
partners" if they have lived together in conjugal relationships
for a defined period of time. For decades, federal pension laws
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and provincial/territorial laws dealing with spousal support and
social assistance have included common law spouses. These
laws both promoted and responded to the economic
vulnerability of women who formed relationships with men
outside of marriage. In many legal contexts, however, marriage
remained the only legally recognized adult personal
relationship into the 1980s and 1990s.
In the past decade, court rulings holding that
discrimination on the basis of marital status and sexual
orientation are prohibited by the Constitution accelerated the
pace of change. Two Supreme Court of Canada rulings played
a pivotal role. In Miron v. Trudel (1995), 4 the Court held that
imposing legal disadvantages on unmarried opposite-sex
cohabitants relative to their married counterparts violates the
constitutional prohibition on marital status discrimination. In
M. v. H. (1999), 5 the Court ruled that imposing legal
disadvantages on same-sex conjugal cohabitants relative to
their unmarried opposite-sex counterparts violates the
constitutional prohibition on discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation.
Together, the Miron v. Trudel and M. v. H. rulings
constitutionalize a principle of conjugal relational equality,
calling into question the validity of all differences in the legal
status of married and unmarried (either same-sex or opposite-
sex) cohabitants.6 While there is still a large gap between
4 Miron v. Trudel, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418, (1995), 124 D.L.R. (4th) 693.
5 M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3, (1999), 171 D.L.R. (4th) 577.
6 The Court will consider these issues again shortly when it hears the
appeal of Walsh v. Bona (2000), 186 D.L.R. (4th) 50, 185 N.S.R. (2d)
190 (N.S.C.A.), leave to appeal granted February 15, 2001, S.C.C.
Bulletin, 2001 at 284. The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal held that the
exclusion of unmarried couples from statutory rights to division of
2001] 275
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constitutional requirements and legislative realities, in the last
few years the federal government and eight provincial
governments have passed laws that, to varying degrees, bring
their statutes closer to recognizing the principle of conjugal
relational equality.
At both the federal and provincial/territorial levels, the
definition of common law spouses or partners applicable to
unmarried cohabitants typically require co-residence for a
certain period of time in a conjugal or marriage-like
relationship. While these laws differ in many important details
that are not the concern of the present discussion - for
example, the required duration of co-residence or whether or
not they embrace same-sex couples - conjugality is a common
prerequisite (with rare exceptions). What follows is a brief
review of the current legislative definitions, many of them
revised and extended by legislatures in the aftermath of the
1999 ruling in M v. H.
A. Federal Laws
Until recently, federal legislation recognized unmarried
cohabitants only in the context of pension and taxation laws.
The passage of the Modernization of Benefits and Obligations
Ac in 2000 has radically altered the legislative landscape.
With the exception of a few Acts on which reforms are
family property on the breakdown of the relationship violates the
equality rights in s. 15 of the Charter.
7 For a summary of the evolution of common law spouses' position in
federal legislation, see B. Cossman & B. Ryder, The Legal
Regulation of Adult Personal Relationships: Evaluating Policy
Objectives and Legal Options in Federal Legislation (Ottawa: Law
Commission of Canada, 2000), Appendix A at 215-19, online:
<http://www.lcc.gc.ca/en/themes/pr/cpra/cr/> (last modified: 31
January 2002).
8 S.C. 2000, c. 12.
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pending,9 unmarried cohabitants now have the same rights as
married spouses in all federal legislation. According to the Act,
a person cohabiting with another in a "conjugal relationship"
for at least a year is now referred to as a "common law
partner". The new definition has been added alongside
"spouses" (now a term reserved to husbands and wives)
throughout the federal statute book. The new definition
contains no reference to gender, thereby extending ascribed
"common law partner" status to same-sex couples. The federal
government took a "one size fits all" approach to implementing
the principle of conjugal relational equality: the same definition
of common law partner appears uniformly in legislation
dealing with a variety of subjects within federal jurisdiction,
such as taxation, employment pensions, old age security,
veterans' pensions, diplomatic immunity, financial institutions,
and criminal law.
B. Provincial/Territorial Laws
Among the provinces, British Columbia, Quebec, Ontario and
Saskatchewan have taken the largest steps towards respecting
conjugal relational equality. Legislation enacted beginning in
the late 1990s in these jurisdictions has extended the rights and
obligations possessed by unmarried opposite-sex cohabitants to
same-sex couples. Like the federal Parliament, the
Saskatchewan legislature took the additional step of according
rights to unmarried cohabitants previously reserved to married
couples.
In British Columbia, the law defines common law
spouses as two persons who have lived together in a "marriage-
9 For example, the Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5.
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like relationship". 10 In Ontario, the government distinguished
itself by opting for terminological segregation on the basis of
sexual orientation in 1999 omnibus legislation: if they live
together in a "conjugal relationship", unmarried opposite-sex
couples are "spouses" and same-sex couples are "same-sex
partners".11 In Quebec, 1999 legislation extended rights and
obligations to two persons "qui vivent maritalement" ("who
live together in a defacto union", in the English version). 2 The
Saskatchewan government, in legislation passed in 2001, opted
for a distinctly unhelpful definition: a common law spouse is
defined tautologically as either of two persons who cohabit "as
spouses".
13
The remaining six provinces - Alberta, Manitoba, New
Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island and
Newfoundland - and the three territories recognize common
law cohabitants for more limited purposes. When they do, they
typically define "spouse" or "common law partner" by
employing the same "marriage-like" or "conjugal" relationship
language that appears in the B.C. and Ontario statutes. 14 One
10 Family Relations Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 128, s. 1, as am. by S.B.C.
1997, c. 20; Definition of Spouse Amendment Act, 1999, S.B.C. 1999,
c. 29; Definition ofSpouse Amendment Act, 2000, S.B.C. 2000, c. 24.
11 An Act to amend certain statutes because of the Supreme Court of
Canada decision in M v. H., S.O. 1999, c. 6.
12 Loi modifiant diverses dispositions legislatives concernant les
conjoints defait, S.Q. 1999, c. 14.
13 Miscellaneous Statutes (Domestic Relations) Amendment Act, 2001,
S.S. 2001, c. 50; Miscellaneous Statutes (Domestic Relations)
Amendment Act, 2001 (No. 2), S.S. 2001, c. 51.
14 In Alberta, spousal support obligations extend to two persons of the
opposite sex who have lived together in a "marriage-like"
relationship: Domestic Relations Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. D-37, s. 1(2), as
am. by S.A. 1999, c. 20, s. 2. In Manitoba, the government added a
definition of "common law partner", defined as a person cohabiting
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exception to the conjugal focus can be found in New
Brunswick, where spousal support obligations are imposed on
two persons who have lived together "in a family relationship
in which one person has been substantially dependent upon the
other for support."15 This definition extends to conjugal
couples as well as others living together, such as two siblings,
in relationships characterized by economic dependency.
Nova Scotia is the only province that has not relied
exclusively on ascribing common law spousal or partner status
to cohabitants as the means of responding to the constitutional
requirement of conjugal relational equality. Two persons who
wish to subscribe to a package of rights and obligations
previously reserved to marital couples may now register as
"domestic partners". Even here, however, the conjugal fixation
of recent reforms is not displaced. Domestic partnership
with another in a conjugal relationship, to statutes dealing with
spousal support, pensions, and death benefits: An Act to Comply with
the Supreme Court of Canada Decision in M. v. H., S.M. 2001, c. 37.
In Newfoundland, the law dealing with spousal support applies to
"partners", defined as two persons who have cohabited in a conjugal
relationship: Family Law Act, R.S.N. 1990, c. F-2, s. 35(c), as
amended by S.N. 2000, c. 29. In the Northwest Territories and
Nunavut, spouses are defined for the purposes of support and
property rights as two persons of the opposite sex who have cohabited
in a conjugal relationship: Family Law Act, S.N.W.T. 1997, c. 18, as
duplicated for Nunavut by s. 29 of the Nunavut Act, S.C. 1993, c. 28.
In Nova Scotia, "common law partners", defined as two persons who
have lived in a conjugal relationship, are now included in laws
dealing with spousal support, taxation and pensions: Law Reform
(2000) Act, S.N.S. 2000, c. 29. In Prince Edward Island and the
Yukon, spousal support obligations extend to two persons of the
opposite sex who have cohabited in a conjugal relationship: Family
Law Act, R.S.P.E.I., c. F-2.1, s. 1(1) and s. 29; Family Property and
Support Act, R.S.Y. 1986, c. 63, s. 1 and s. 35.
15 Family Services Act, S.N.B. 1983, c. 16, s. 112(3), as am. by S.N.B.
2000, c. 59.
2001] 279
280 REVUE CANADIENNE DE DROIT FAMILIAL [Vol. 18
declarations are open only to "two individuals who are
cohabiting or intend to cohabit in a conjugal relationship. 16
While the notion of conjugality or marriage-like has
become legally ubiquitous in the regulation of non-marital
cohabitation in Canada, one searches in vain for legislative
guidance on its meaning. It is not defined in any Canadian
statute. The task of giving meaning to this crucial relational
characteristic has been left to administrators, tribunals and
courts. What is marriage-like like? Is there such a thing as a
typical or standard marriage? Among the multitude and
diversity of relationships between married men and women,
can we identify common characteristics of their shared lives
apart from the experience of having exchanged vows and
signed forms in a religious or civil proceeding? Or, should we
abandon the attempt to assign a fixed set of functional
characteristics to the state of being married, and acknowledge
that it is increasingly unintelligible to speak of a relationship as
being "marriage-like"? The absence of a legislative definition
suggests that the meaning of conjugality is either self-evident
or difficult to pin down. The record of judicial attempts to
grapple with the notion supports the latter conclusion.
16 Law Reform (2000) Act, S.N.S. 2000, c. 29, s. 45, adding a new "Part
II: Domestic Partners" to the Vital Statistics Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c.
494. The Quebec government is considering enacting legislation
permitting the registration of "civil unions" between two unmarried
persons of the same sex who are not closely related to each other and
do not have a common law partner. See the draft bill, Loi instituant
l'union civile des personnes de mgme sexe et modifiant le Code civil
et d'autres dispositions legislatives, online: Assemblde Nationale du
Quebec <http://www.assnat.qc.ca/fra/publications/Av-projets/0l-fap
01 .htm> (last modified: 22 February 2002).
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III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS
OF CONJUGALITY
Just as the legal content and social understandings of marriage
have changed over time, so too have judicial interpretations of
conjugal or marriage-like relationships. 17 Emphasis that can be
found in the older cases on the performance of traditional
gender roles - the woman "rendering housewifely duties" and
the man supporting her "as a husband should 18 - have faded as
the explicitly gendered and patriarchal content of matrimonial
regulation has been replaced by the notion that marriage is a
partnership between equals not tied to the assumption of any
particular social roles. 19
Similarly, recent case law by and large does not
support the notion, more evident in some earlier cases, 20 that
financial dependence of one co-resident on another is an
essential feature of a conjugal relationship. As we have argued
elsewhere, an approach based on economic dependency reflects
17 As Wilson J. noted in Macmillan-Dekker v. Dekker (2000), 10 R.F.L.
(5th) 352 (Sup. Ct. J.), online: QL (OJ) at para. 46: "The case law,
viewed historically with respect to what constitutes a marriage
relationship, is a mirror of social values which have fluctuated over
time."
18 Thomas v. Thomas, [1948] 2 K.B. 294 at 297, per Lord Goddard C.J.
19 A number of judges have noted that Lord Goddard's comments in
Thomas, ibid., do not reflect contemporary understandings of
marriage: see Molodowich v. Penttinen (1980), 17 R.F.L. (2d) 376 at
381 (Ont. Dist. Ct.); Szuts v. Ontario (Commissioner of Social
Services) (1986), 13 O.A.C. 200 (H. Ct.), online: QL (OJ); Gostlin v.
Kergin (1986), 3 B.C.L.1. (2d) 264, 1 1.F.L. (3d) 448 at 454
(B.C.C.A.); Richardson v. Richardson (1990), 107 N.B.R. (2d) 49, 70
D.L.R. (4th) 563 (C.A.), online: QL (NBJ) at para. 13; Macmillan-
Dekker, supra note 17 at para. 48.
20 E.g., Gostlin, ibid. at 453; Re Stoikiewics and Filas (1978), 7 R.F.L.
(2d) 366,21 O.R. (2d) 717 (Ont. U.F.C.).
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the stereotype of marriage as a relationship of inequality and
dependency. 21 Defining the spousal relationship in terms of the
economic dependency of women is at odds with the partnership
model of spousal relationships that increasingly informs family
law. The emphasis should be placed on interdependency and
equality, rather than dependency.22 Just as the discourse of
spousal support more generally has shifted from an emphasis
on dependency to interdependency, 23 we would expect to see a
similar shift in the definition of unmarried conjugal
relationships.
A shift from a dependency to an interdependency
model is indeed evident in many judicial rulings. A good
example is Fitton v. Hewton Estate (1997),24 a case involving a
claim pursuant to dependant's relief legislation by the
deceased's long-term lover. Even though the statutory
definition of common law spouse in the legislation included a
requirement that the applicant be "dependant upon the
deceased for maintenance and support",25 the court held that an
21 Cossman & Ryder, supra note 3 at 80.
22 Ibid.
23 Since Moge v. Moge, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 813, (1992), 99 D.L.R. (4th)
456 (S.C.C.), the emphasis in spousal support law has been on
compensating for the economic advantages and disadvantages of an
interdependent relationship. Even in Bracklow v. Bracklow, [1999] 1
S.C.R. 420, (1999), 169 D.L.R. (4th) 577 (S.C.C.), where the
Supreme Court of Canada endorsed a non-compensatory approach to
spousal support, the Court can be seen to be emphasizing the idea of
marriage as involving mutual obligations. In explaining the theory of
marriage that she sees as informing this non-compensatory approach,
McLachlin J. wrote (at para. 30) that "[t]he mutual obligation theory
of marriage and divorce...posits marriage as a union that creates
interdependencies that cannot be easily unravelled"(emphasis added).
24 (1997), 38 B.C.L.R. (3d) 78, online: QL (YJ) (C.A.).
25 Dependants ReliefAct, R.S.Y. 1986, c. 44, s. 1(f).
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interdependent relationship between financially independent
persons meets this test: "It is enough if the couple cooperate in
assisting each other so they are dependant one upon the other in
the improvement of the enjoyment of their life., 26 Justice
Braidwood wrote that the definition of common law spouse
should be interpreted so as to give effect to the
realities of our current society. These include
the desirability of not only the male but also
the female partner in a common-law
relationship, as indeed in a marriage, to be
financially and economically independent and
to have the ability to enjoy a fulfilling life in
the market place as well as to rear children, if
so desired. It should be interpreted in the
context of equality between the spouses.27
If the performance of traditional gender roles and
economic dependency are no longer considered necessary
components of marriage-like relationships, what are the
defining attributes of those relationships? Two approaches now
prevail in the case law. The first approach locates marriage
equivalence in the voluntary assumption of long-term
commitments to mutual economic support. The inquiry focuses
on the subjective intentions of the parties to a non-marital
relationship. On this approach, the only essential, defining
feature of a marital relationship is the voluntary assumption of
mutual support obligations "until death do us part". We will
call this the "subjective equivalence" test. The second approach
finds marital equivalence in a bundle of factors that together
indicate the existence of an emotionally and economically
interdependent relationship. The focus of the inquiry is on the
26 Fitton, supra note 24 at para. 39.
27 Ibid. atpara. 38.
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objectively observable features of the relationship. We will call
this the "functional equivalence" test.
A. Subjective Equivalence
The leading case advancing the subjective equivalence
approach is the decision of the British Columbia Court of
Appeal in Gostlin v. Kergin.8 In determining the degree to
which cohabitants are subjected to spousal rights and
obligations, Justice Lambert was concerned that "independence
should be a choice" and that the law "should not force them
into mutual commitments that they do not want."29 Therefore,
in his view, the touchstone for determining whether an
unmarried couple is living in a marriage-like relationship is
whether "they have voluntarily embraced the permanent
support obligations" in the legislation.30 If the nature of their
subjective intentions proves elusive, then objective factors may
be relied upon to illuminate whether they have pledged to each
other permanent mutual support. Justice Lambert listed a
number of objective factors that should be examined if a
mutual commitment to support is not clear from the parties'
account of their own understandings:
Did the couple refer to themselves, when
talking to their friends, as husband and wife, or
as spouses, or in some equivalent way that
recognized a long-term commitment? Did they
share the legal rights to their living
accommodation? Did they share property? Did
they share their vacations? In short, did they
share their lives? And, perhaps most important
of all, did one of them surrender financial
28 Supra note 19.
29 Ibid.; 3 B.C.L.R. (2d) at 267.
30 Ibid.
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independence and become economically
dependent on the other, in accordance with a
mutual agreement?
31
This approach examines a range of functional dimensions of
the relationship, but solely for the purpose of ascertaining
whether the couple intended to embrace a long-term
commitment to mutual support.
The Gostlin ruling is still a leading authority in British
Columbia 2 and the Yukon,33 although it has received little
support in other jurisdictions in recent years. Searching for
subjective intention is often fruitless, since cohabitants may
have different views regarding the nature of their
commitments, and other cohabitants may have given the matter
little thought as their relationships evolved.34 Even if shared
intentions regarding mutual support obligations can be
ascertained, the autonomy concerns that ground the subjective
equivalence approach have given way to a concern with
protecting cohabitants from economic disadvantages produced
over the course of an interdependent relationship. If there truly
31 Ibid. at 268.
32 Gostlin was reaffirmed by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in
Takacs v. Gallo (1998), 157 D.L.R. (4th) 623, 48 B.C.L.R. (3d) 265
(B.C.C.A.).
33 In Fitton v. Hewton Estate, supra note 24, the Yukon Court of Appeal
applied Gostlin.
34 As Blumberg has noted, "reported cases, sociological studies and
gender-related social and economic conditions" belie the notion that
cohabiting couples "operate with one heart and one mind despite their
conflicting interests": G.G. Blumberg, "Cohabitation Without
Marriage: A Different Perspective" (1981) 28 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1125
at 1168. See also W. Holland, "Cohabitation and Marriage - A
Meeting at the Crossroads?" (1990) 7 C.F.L.Q. 31 at 47 ("[m]any
couples drift into long-term relationships without any clear idea of
what is happening").
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is a mutual desire to live outside of spousal support rights and
obligations, cohabitants can enter into a domestic contract to
this effect.35 In a recent dissenting opinion where she called
into question the Gostlin approach, Justice Huddart wrote that
over the course of cohabitation finances
become intertwined and financial dependency
may emerge by the way the parties structure
their relationship so that at its termination, one
party is in need of support even in
circumstances where neither party intended a
lifetime commitment. As in so many areas of
life, conduct speaks louder than words.36
In sum, the subjective equivalence approach appears to
be falling out of judicial favour. Notably, the Supreme Court of
Canada did not mention the parties' intentions regarding
mutual support when it addressed the meaning of conjugality in
M v. H., to be discussed further below. The second approach,
one based on a search for functional equivalence through an
35 See Holland, supra note 3 at 158; Cossman & Ryder, supra note 3 at
58-66. As L'Heureux-Dub6 J. wrote in her concurring opinion in
Miron, supra note 4 at para. 101: "it must be recalled that the
imposition of marriage-like mutual rights and obligations upon
couples in a relationship analogous to marriage need not deprive them
of the autonomy required to make personal choices if these persons
also have the possibility of resorting to domestic contract to exclude
the effects of the legislation. Rather than placing the onus on
unmarried couples to contract into any such mutual rights and
obligations, inclusion within the legislation merely shifts the onus to
those who wish to preserve individual autonomy to contract out."
36 Takacs, supra note 32 at para. 40. Another careful dissection and
rejection of the Gostlin approach can be found in Wilson J.'s
judgment in Macmillan-Dekker, supra note 17 at paras. 50-67 (para.
67: Gostlin is "clearly at odds with the practical realities of social
policy upon which support obligations are imposed").
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examination of objective features of a relationship, is now
dominant in the jurisprudence.
B. Functional Equivalence
Pursuant to this approach, legal decision-makers seek to
identify the basic dimensions and functions of a marital
relationship, and then determine whether the relationship in
question has a sufficient number of these features to qualify as
a conjugal or marriage-like relationship.37 This approach differs
from the subjective equivalence approach in that it examines a
broader range of relational attributes, and in that the objectively
observable features of the relationship are the focus of the
inquiry rather than the stated subjective understandings of the
parties. The leading case in the common law provinces (apart
from British Columbia) is Molodowich v. Penttinen (1980),38
which consolidated the relevant functional attributes under
seven headings: 1) shelter; 2) sexual and personal behaviour; 3)
services; 4) social; 5) societal perceptions of the couple; 6)
economic support; and 7) children.39 Under each heading,
37 "Courts have, by and large, adopted a particular view of marriage by
asserting that the marriage relationship has certain characteristics and
that these ought to form the basis for a comparison with the
relationship in question. If a significant (but unspecified) number of
correspondences are found, the relationship under scrutiny will be
held to be a 'conjugal' relationship.": Macmillan-Dekker, ibid. at
para. 44.
38 Supra note 19.
39 In New South Wales, where ascribed status has been the preferred
means of implementing conjugal relational equality, the Supreme
Court formulated a similar list of factors to determine whether
cohabitants are in a "de facto relationship". See D. v. McA (1986), 11
Fam. L.R. 214 at 227 (N.S.W.S.C.). This list is now incorporated in s.
4(2) of the New South Wales Property (Relationships) Act 1984,
online: Australian Legal Information Institute website <http://www.
austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consolact/pal984298/s4.html>.
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Judge Kurisko set out a detailed and oft-quoted set of inquiries.
A review of these inquiries brings home the striking degree to
which the administration of the functional equivalence
approach requires investigations into the intimate details of
cohabitants' lives. For example, under the heading "sexual and
personal behaviour," Judge Kurisko suggested that the
following questions should be posed:
Did the parties have sexual relations? If not,
why not? Did they maintain an attitude of
fidelity to each other? What were their feelings
toward each other? Did they communicate on a
personal level? Did they eat their meals
together? What, if anything, did they do to
assist each other with problems or during
illness? Did they buy gifts for each other on
special occasions?
40
The functional equivalence approach has been
criticized for the extent to which it measures cohabitants'
relationships against a norm of an idealized marital
relationship.41 As we have argued previously, there is a danger
that "the idealized functional approach sets up a monolithic and
mythical image of the marital relationship, against which all
relationships are evaluated".42 Indeed, it is tempting to
speculate how many marriages would fail to qualify as
"marriage-like" if they were subjected to similar scrutiny. In
her thoughtful dissent in Mossop, Justice L'Heureux-Dub6
cautioned that functional definitions of family should not be
used to establish one model of family as the norm. Her
40 Supranote 19 at 381.
41 Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on the Rights and
Responsibilities of Cohabitants (Toronto: O.L.R.C., 1993) at 62.
42 Cossman & Ryder, supra note 3 at 78.
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comments are equally relevant to thinking about functional
definitions of common law spouses or partners:
The use of a functional approach would be
problematic if it were used to establish one
model of family as the norm, and to then
require families to prove that they are similar
to that norm. It is obvious that the application
of certain variables could work to the
detriment of certain types of families. By way
of example, the requirement that a couple hold
themselves out to the public as a couple may
not, perhaps, be appropriate to same-sex
couples, who still often find that public
acknowledgement of their sexual orientation
results in discriminatory treatment. It is also
possible that a functional model may be used
to subject non-traditional families to a higher
level of scrutiny than families who appear to
conform more to the traditional norm.
43
Along the same lines, Justice Cory in Egan noted that
same-sex relationships need not conform to an idealized norm
to qualify as conjugal.44 Lower courts too have been sensitive
to this concern, while defending the ability of the Molodowich
test to assess the essential attributes of conjugal relationships in
a flexible and contextual manner without relying on a single
marital ideal.
43 Mossop v. Canada (Attorney General), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 554, (1993),
100 D.L.R. (4th) 658 [hereinafter Mossop cited to S.C.R.] at 638.
44 Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513, (1995), 124 D.L.R. (4th) 609
at para. 169.
45 See, e.g., Diebert v. Calder (2001), 14 R.F.L. (5th) 21 (Q.B.), online:
QL (AJ) at paras. 68-69.
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As a result, on the functional equivalence approach,
marriage-like is not like any particular marriage. Rather,
marriage-like is like marriages tend to be, or perhaps more
accurately, how judges imagine marriages ought to be. The
inquiry is guided by a flexible and evolving ideal, but it is still
an ideal. Notwithstanding the sensitivity to diversity evident in
recent judicial rulings, the functional equivalence approach is
necessarily tied to the pursuit of an imagined marital ideal.
Because the relevance of marriages, in all their diversity, to the
attainment of many legislative objectives is no longer apparent,
so too has it become difficult to understand the point of the
search for the elusive ideal of marriage equivalence.
In Macmillan-Dekker, Justice Wilson summed up
current understandings of the functional equivalence approach
nicely:
I conclude that there is no single, static model
of a conjugal relationship, nor of marriage.
Rather, there are a cluster of factors which
reflect the diversity of conjugal and marriage
relationships that exist in modem Canadian
society. Each case must be examined in light
of its own unique, objective facts... the seven
factors [listed in Molodowich] are meant to
provide the Court with a flexible yet objective
tool for examining the nature of relationships
on a case-by-case basis. The emphasis should
not be on the parties' subjective intention as
provided in their viva voce evidence, but upon
the objective facts that are indicia of both a
conjugal/spousal relationship and the parties'
objective intentions.46
46 Supra note 17 at para.68.
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The Molodowich functional equivalence approach is
now dominant in the jurisprudence. With the exception of
British Columbia and the Yukon, where the Gostlin subjective
equivalence approach is followed, courts across the country
have adopted the functional equivalence approach to
conjugality.47 In M. v. H. (1999),48 the Supreme Court of
Canada endorsed Molodowich, likely securing its status as the
leading case for some years to come. Given the importance of
the Supreme Court's ruling in M. v. H. - where a majority
engaged for the first time with the meaning of "conjugal" in the
context of non-marital cohabitation - a consideration of the
Court's comments follows.
C. M. v. H.: The Supreme Court of Canada and
Conjugality
In M. v. H., the Supreme Court, by an 8-1 majority, held that s.
29 of the Ontario Family Law Act49 discriminated on the basis of
sexual orientation by excluding lesbians and gay men from the
right to seek spousal support from a same-sex partner with whom
they have cohabited. In their joint judgment on behalf of six
members of the Court, Justices Cory and Iacobucci50 found that s.
47 For recent examples of courts citing and applying the Molodowich
factors, see Rangwala v. Canada (2000), 4 C.T.C. 2430 (T.C.C.),
online: QL (TCJ); Lavoie v. Canada (1999), 2 C.T.C. 2137 (T.C.C.),
online: QL (TCJ); Diebert, supra note 45; Spracklin v. Kichton
(2000), 278 A.R. 27 (Q.B.), online: QL (A]); Cooper v. Cooper
(2001), 13 R.F.L. (5th) 29 (Nfld. & P.E.I. C.A.), online: QL (NJ);
Hazlewood v. Kent, [2000] O.J. No. 5263 (Sup. Ct. J.), online: QL
(OJ); Macmillan-Dekker, supra note 17; Holt v. Ogglesby, [2000]
O.J. No. 4055 (Sup. Ct. J.), online: QL (OJ).
48 Supra note 5.
49 I-S.O. 1990, c. F.3.
50 Cory J. wrote the s. 15 portion of the analysis, and lacobucci J. dealt
with the s. 1 and remedial issues. Lamer C.J. and L'Heureux-Dub6,
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29 of the Act violated the human dignity of lesbian and gay
couples. In the words of Justice Cory, the exclusion of these
couples promotes the view that they are "less worthy of
recognition and protection. It implies that they are judged to be
incapable of forming intimate relationships of economic
interdependence as compared to opposite-sex couples.'
Moreover, "it perpetuates the disadvantages suffered by
individuals in same-sex relationships and contributes to the
erasure of their existence., 52 The majority held that the exclusion
was not rationally related to the objectives underlying the spousal
support provisions in Part Il of the Family Law Act, which they
characterized as dealing equitably with the economic needs of
persons in interdependent relationships and the alleviation of
claims on the public purse by privatizing the costs of family
breakdown.53
The ruling in M v. H. was groundbreaking. For the
first time, the Supreme Court recognized the "conjugal" nature
of same-sex relationships. After twice postponing a resolution
of the issue in the 1990s,54 the Court recognized that persons in
same-sex relationships are entitled to the same rights and
responsibilities as unmarried persons in opposite-sex
relationships. However, the question of the meaning of
conjugality did not receive a detailed consideration. One of the
crucial questions that challenges to spousal definitions brought
by same-sex couples have raised over the years is not only who
is a spouse, but also what makes a spouse a spouse. Earlier
Supreme Court opinions have included a more comprehensive
McLachlin and Binnie JJ. concurred with their joint judgment Major J.
and Bastarache J. wrote separate concurring judgments. Gonthier J.
dissented.
51 Supra note 5 at para. 73.
52 Ibid.
13 Ibid. at para. 93.
54 Mossop, supra note 43; Egan, supra note 44.
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discussion of the scope and content of spousal and familial
status - notably, Justice L'Heureux-Dub6's dissenting opinion
in Mossop (1993) 55 in favour of recognizing same-sex couples
as family, and, on the other side of the debate, Justice La
Forest's opinion in Egan (1995)56 affirming the exclusion of
same-sex couples from spousal definitions. These two opinions
canvass the various policy arguments in support of and against
the recognition of same-sex couples as family or spouses. And
in so doing, they canvass a range of opinion on the nature of
the spousal relationship.
The ruling in M. v. H. shares the spirit of Justice
L'Heureux-Dub6's opinion in Mossop, given their common
conclusions that the exclusion of same-sex couples from
definitions of spouse or family is discriminatory. However, the
majority ruling in M. v. H. did not refer to Justice L'Heureux-
Dub6's lengthy discussion and endorsement of functional
understandings of family forms. In fact, the ruling in M v. H.
steered away from an extensive policy discussion of the
meaning of spouse.
Instead, Justice Cory focused on the narrow question of
whether a same-sex couple could meet the definition of
conjugal within the meaning of s. 29 of the Ontario Family
Law Act. He began by stating that
same-sex couples will often form long, lasting,
loving and intimate relationships. The choices
they make in the context of those relationships
may give rise to the financial dependence of
one partner on the other. Though it might be
argued that same-sex couples do not live
together in 'conjugal' relationships in the sense
55 Ibid..
56 Supra note 44.
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that they cannot 'hold themselves out' as
husband and wife, on this issue I am in
agreement with the reasoning and conclusions
of the majority of the Court of Appeal. 7
He then endorsed, with little elaboration, the functional
equivalence approach to conjugality. Justice Cory cited
Molodowich as setting out "the generally accepted
characteristics of a conjugal relationship. They include shared
shelter, sexual and personal behavior, services, social activities,
economic support and children, as well as the societal
perception of the couple".58 He appeared to be taking into
account some of the criticisms of this functional approach to
the family, noting that these dimensions of family life will be
present in varying degrees, and that it will not be necessary for
a couple to satisfy all of these dimensions for their relationship
to be conjugal:
In order to come within the definition, neither
opposite-sex couples nor same-sex couples are
57 Supra note 5 at para 58. At the Ontario Court of Appeal, (1996), 31
O.R. (3d) 417 at 442-3, Charron J.A. stated that same-sex couples
may have conjugal relationships even though they may not be "out"
to their communities: "The existing case-law on this point has
developed in the context of heterosexual relationships only. Even so,
the existing jurisprudence makes it clear that couples do not have to
fit a singular traditional model in order to demonstrate that their
relationship is conjugal within the meaning of the law. The extent to
which these different elements of a conjugal heterosexual relationship
will be taken into account will vary with the circumstances of each
case. In the same way, some factors may take on a greater or lesser
significance than others in the case of same-sex couples. For
example, some same-sex cohabitees may not have openly and
publicly presented themselves as a couple for fear of reprisal or
prejudice, a concern which may not be present to the same degree, if
at all, in the case of unmarried heterosexual cohabitees."
58 Supra note 5 at par. 59 (citing Molodowich, supra note 19).
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required to fit precisely the traditional marital
model to demonstrate that the relationship is
"conjugal". 59
He continued by emphasizing that sexual relations were not a
necessary feature of conjugality and that the Molodowich list of
factors must be considered flexibly in every case:
Certainly an opposite-sex couple may, after
many years together, be considered to be in a
conjugal relationship although they have
neither children nor sexual relations.
Obviously the weight to be accorded the
various elements or factors to be considered in
determining whether an opposite-sex couple is
in a conjugal relationship will vary widely and
almost infinitely. The same must hold true of
same-sex couples. Courts have wisely
determined that the approach to determining
whether a relationship is conjugal must be
flexible. This must be so, for the relationships
of all couples will vary widely. In these
circumstances, the Court of Appeal correctly
concluded that there is nothing to suggest that
same-sex couples do not meet the legal
definition of "conjugal'. 6O
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid. at para. 60. See also Richardson v. Richardson, supra note 19 at
para. 13 ("The parties may, for a number of reasons, such as age,
illness or indifference, choose not to have sexual relations but still
live together and hold themselves out to be husband and wife in other
respects. For that reason, it is my view that the trial judge was wrong
to have made sexual relations between the parties a requisite for a
conjugal relationship.').
2001] 295
296 REVUE CANADIENNE DE DROIT FAMILIAL [Vol. 18
Justice Cory said nothing further about the meaning of
conjugality. Without actually engaging with the critiques of the
functional approach to conjugality, he appeared to recognize
some of the dangers of this approach, in noting that neither
opposite-sex nor same-sex couples are required to fit precisely
within the traditional marital model. Like many lower court
judges, he pulled back from a rigid functional approach,
emphasizing instead that the factors to be taken into account in
determining whether a couple is conjugal "will vary widely and
almost infinitely", since "the relationships of all couples will
vary widely."
61
D. Conjugality After M. v. H.
There are a number of criticisms that may continue to be
directed to the current definitions for ascribed spousal status.
The prevailing definition of cohabitation and conjugality
remains less than clear. Following M v. H., the test for
conjugality involves a consideration of the various factors in
Molodowich, which according to the Court, "may vary widely
and almost infinitely".62 In so doing, the Court has repeated its
increasingly characteristic emphasis on judicial discretion in
family law.63 Family law is often cast as a fact-driven area, best
left to trial judges who can balance the various factors and
circumstances on a case-by-case basis. In Mv. H., the Supreme
Court has once again simply set out a wide-ranging list of
factors that will have to be balanced by trial courts. The Court
has given very little guidance on the question of what, if
anything, makes a spousal relationship unique. Many of the
seven Molodowich factors will be met to varying degrees by
61 Supra note 5 at para 60.
62 Ibid.
63 For a discussion of this trend, see B. Cossman, "Developments in
Family Law: The 1998-1999 Term" (2000) 11 Supreme Court L.R.
(2d) 433.
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most adult domestic relationships. If none is essential, what
makes a spouse a spouse? What distinguishes spouses from
other interdependent domestic relationships between adults?
How many of the factors must co-residents meet before they
are considered spouses? Are any of the seven Molodowich
factors more important than others? The Court gives little
guidance, other than to emphasize discretion, flexibility and
diversity.
The uncertainties associated with this approach to
conjugality are compounded by the Court's observations that a
conjugal relationship may exist, even in the absence of a sexual
relationship, which is often assumed in ordinary parlance to be
a central if not defining feature of a "conjugal" relationship.
Again, there are many advantages to the Court's understanding
of conjugality. The presence or absence of a sexual relationship
is a poor indicator of whether cohabitants should be entitled to
legal rights and responsibilities. It is both over- and under-
inclusive. Many persons who have a sexual relationship do not
have a close economic relationship. And conversely, many
persons who do not have a sexual relationship may have an
economically and emotionally interdependent relationship. It is
not clear how the details of cohabitants' sexual lives are
relevant in any way to the attainment of legitimate state
objectives. Such an inquiry constitutes an undue intrusion into
personal privacy.64 In our view, policy-makers ought to give
64 As we have already indicated, the functional equivalence approach to
conjugality requires legal decision-makers "to engage in inquiries
into the intimate details of relationships, intruding on personal
privacy" (O.L.R.C., supra note 41 at 62). This problem is an
inevitable feature of any legal regime that seeks to draw legal
distinctions between categories of co-residents depending on the
nature of their relationships. If the law must treat roommates or co-
tenants differently than common law spouses or partners, then
significant invasions of privacy will surely follow. However,
accepting the inevitability of the problem should not deter us from
seeking to minimize it. In particular, the details of cohabitants' sexual
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serious consideration to whether the hearts and bedrooms of the
nation need to be so fully exposed to public dissection, as the
Molodowich test requires. A sexual relationship should simply
not be a relevant criterion. However, if we are right that the
existence of a sexual relationship ought not to be a decisive
factor that determines the scope of application of many laws,
then the exclusion of many non-conjugal relationships from
many legislative policies becomes more and more difficult to
sustain.
Indeed, in light of the observation made by the
Supreme Court (and by lower courts in other cases) that
conjugal relationships need not have a sexual component, the
jurisprudence is undermining the very distinction between
conjugal and non-conjugal relationships on which legislative
definitions of spouse and common law partner rest. In most
contexts, legislatures have not contemplated that definitions of
spouse include enduring non-sexual relationships between
adult co-residents - such as siblings, adult children and their
parents, or non-relatives sharing accommodation. But what is
the basis for excluding persons in these relationships from
legislative policies? Their relationships may be characterized
by joint residence, emotional intimacy, and economic
interdependency. They may provide domestic care and support
to each other. One person may be entirely economically
dependent on the other. While they would not hold themselves
out to their communities as spouses, their relationships may be
characterized by many of the dimensions of family life that
give rise to legal rights and responsibilities on the functional
equivalence approach.
Conjugality has long been the dividing line between
those opposite-sex relationships that are included in the
definition of spouse, and those that are not. And as our review
lives are simply not relevant in any way to the attainment of
legitimate state objectives.
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of recent legislative changes above illustrates, conjugality is
rapidly becoming the dividing line between all cohabiting
relationships - same-sex and opposite-sex alike. Yet, in the
aftermath of M v. H., the meaning of conjugality remains
elusive, and the distinction between conjugal and non-conjugal
couples has begun to unravel. The approach adopted by the
Supreme Court and a number of lower courts in the recent
decisions canvassed above is undoubtedly an improvement
over a functional approach that holds fast to a single idealized
norm of marriage. However, in sacrificing clarity and
predictability for flexibility and diversity, the judicial
understanding of conjugality now comes close to a "I know it
when I see it" approach.65 Conjugality remains the key in
deciding whether a relationship is spousal or not, yet it is
becoming less clear how and why a conjugal relationship is to
be distinguished from a non-conjugal one.
The instability of conjugality as a legal concept is
evident from our examination of the recent case law and the
Supreme Court's first authoritative comments on the issue in
Cory J.'s opinion in M v. H. We will turn our attention now to
65 For this reason, perhaps it is not a coincidence that several recent
rulings have fallen back on variations of the "duck" test to determine
whether co-residents are spouses: Sanford v. Canada (2001), D.T.C.
12 (T.C.C.), online: QL (TCJ) at para. 17 ("If a two-legged creature
with feathers waddles like a duck, quacks like a duck, and looks like a
duck, it must be a duck."); R. v. Jantunen, [1994] O.J. No. 889 (Gen.
Div.), online: QL (OJ) at para. 52 ("if a bird walks like a duck,
quacks like a duck, and flies like a duck, it can be concluded that it is
a duck."). Reg Graycar and Jenni Millbank make a similar
observation about the definition of defacto relationships in Australia.
While it has "no settled legal meaning", "most Australians would
'know it when they see it', yet if asked what the legal criteria were,
would respond with a wide variety of answers": R. Graycar and J
Millbank, "The Bride Wore Pink.. .To the Property (Relationships)
Legislation Amendment Act 1999: Relationships Law Reform in New
South Wales" (2000) 17 Can. J. Fam. L. 227 at 239.
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social welfare laws, a context in which this instability has long
been evident as part of a regime of spousal regulation that has
had pernicious consequences for low-income persons.
IV. ASCRIBING SPOUSAL STATUS IN SOCIAL
WELFARE LAWS
The meaning of spouse has followed a rather different
trajectory in the social welfare context. It has been the subject
of greater statutory attention, as well as the site of considerable
contestation. Nonetheless, the meaning of conjugality for the
purposes of ascribing spousal status in social welfare laws
shares a number of general characteristics with the approach to
conjugality in other legal contexts. As elsewhere, conjugality in
the social welfare context is determined by a functional
equivalence approach, although one that is more strictly
delineated by statute and regulation.
We will begin by describing some of the definitions of
spouse that have been employed in provincial social welfare
laws. Some of these definitions expressly include non-conjugal
relationships between co-residents within the definition of
spouse or common law partner. In Ontario, for example, sex is
not only unnecessary to conjugality (as the Supreme Court held
in M v. H.), it is not even a factor that can be considered. A
sexual relationship has been deemed to be immaterial to the
existence of a spousal relationship since 1987. We then
consider several court rulings that have reined in expansive
definitions of spouse to restrict the negative consequences that
"spouse in the house" rules have for the personal and financial
autonomy of recipients of social assistance. The social welfare
context provides poignant examples of the problems that result
from the application of the functional equivalence approach
affirmed in M v. H., namely, serious invasions of privacy and
uncertainty arising from the instability of the distinction
between conjugal and non-conjugal couples.
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As Shelley Gavigan has noted, the definition of spouse
in social assistance legislation "has always been broad in reach
and mean in its application".66 Persons seeking income
assistance risk having their benefits reduced or eliminated if
they share accommodation and expenses with other adults who
may be considered to be spouses or partners. Fiscal and social
conservatism have produced remarkably expansive definitions
of spouses in a number of provinces, definitions that focus on
economic interdependence and thus expressly abandon the
distinction between conjugal and non-conjugal relationships
that guides the law in other areas.
For example, in New Brunswick welfare regulations,
spouse is defined as including "a person who resides with the
unit head, who shares the responsibilities of the unit and who
benefits economically from the sharing of food, shelter, or
facilities. 67 This definition includes any group of persons
living together in an economically interdependent relationship.
In Quebec, welfare legislation defines spouses as including
persons who "vivent maritalement" (live together in a de facto
union, in the English version).68 While this definition appears
to be restricted to conjugal relationships, welfare authorities
have interpreted it in an expansive manner. The following three
criteria are applied to determine whether "une vie maritale"
exists:
1. Cohabitation: le fait de vivre sous un m~me
toit; 2. Secours mutuel: 'entraide, le r6confort
et le support que l'on retrouve chez un couple
mari6; 3. Commune renommde: le fait d'tre
66 S. Gavigan, "What is a Spouse?", supra note 3 at 143.
67 N.B. Reg. 95-61, s. 2 (General Regulation under the Family Income
Security Act, R.S.N.B., c. F-2.01).
68 Loi sur le soutien du revenu et favorisant l'emploi et la solidariti
sociale, R.S.Q. 1998, c. S-32.001, s. 19.
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considdr6 comme un couple par son entourage.
La cohabitation et le secours mutuel sont les
elements constitutifs de la vie maritale; le
second devant compldter le premier d~s que
son existence est d6montrde, et la commune
renommde n'6tant qu'un facteur facultatif.
69
A sexual component is notably absent from this definition.
Since mutual support and cohabitation are the only required
elements, many persons living together in interdependent
relationships are at risk of having their entitlements to social
assistance diminished by a finding that they are living "la vie
maritale".
Ontario welfare regulations put in place a similar test.
A co-resident will be considered a spouse or same-sex partner
"if the social and familial aspects of the relationship between
the person and the applicant or recipient amount to
cohabitation" and they provide "financial support" to each
other.70 The regulations also provide that "sexual factors shall
not be investigated or considered in determining whether or not
a person is a spouse or same-sex partner., 71 This latter
provision was added to the regulations in 1987 to limit the
69 Qudbec (Procureur general) c. Pageau, [1992] A.Q. no. 327 (C.S.) at
par. 33 (quoting Nicole Mallette, Loi annotge sur l'aide sociale
(Montr6al 1986) at 7), aff'd [1996] A.Q. No. 2696 (C.A.).
Translation: "1. Cohabitation: living under the same roof; 2. Mutual
support: the aid, comfort and support characteristic of married
couples; 3. Public recognition: being considered a couple by one's
community. Cohabitation and mutual support are the defining
elements of marital life; mutual support must be present once
cohabitation is established, and public recognition is only a secondary
consideration."
70 0. Reg. 134/98, s. 1(1).
71 Ibid., s. 1(2).
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invasions of privacy and over-zealous enforcement of celibacy
that had characterized the administration of the scheme.
The Ontario regulations are notable in that they use the
term "cohabitation" to define a disqualifying relationship,
whether or not sexual intimacy is a feature of the relationship.
According to the policy directives issued by the Ministry,
"three key areas are to be considered to determine cohabitation:
residence in the same dwelling place or shared residency;
financial interdependence; and social and familial
circumstances. All three areas must be present for cohabitation
purposes."72 Unlike the definition of spouse for the purposes of
support obligations in Ontario, which require cohabitation for
three years (or in a relationship of some permanence if there is
a child of the relationship), no minimum period of cohabitation
is required by the welfare regulations. 73 A spousal relationship
exists as soon as the functional criteria are met.
The expansive definitions of spouse and the hazards
they pose for low-income persons sharing accommodation have
been contested in the courts in a number of jurisdictions. The
events that gave rise to these cases provide further evidence of
the instability in practice of the distinction between conjugal
and non-conjugal relationships. Courts have sought to restrict
the definition of conjugality to limit the negative impact of
these rules on the personal and financial autonomy of social
assistance recipients.
72 DIR 14.0-7, June 1, 1998.
73 See the definitions of spouse and same-sex partner in s. 1(1) of the
current regulations, supra note 70. In 1987, the definition of spouse
was amended to introduce a three-year cohabitation requirement.
Family Benefits Act Regulations, R.R.O. 1990, Regulation 318,
s.l(1)(d)(iv), as am. by 0. Reg. 589/87, s.l(l). In 1995, this three-
year grace period for "trial" relationships was repealed: 0. Reg.
410/95.
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The case of Brunette c. Qudbec (1999) 74 involved a 64-
year-old permanently disabled woman who needed assistance
with many aspects of daily living. She invited tmard, a 54-
year-old mentally disabled man, to share her accommodation
with her. Brunette and Emard lived together, shared expenses
and provided care and support to each other. They were not
physically attracted to each other. They never had a sexual
relationship. Nevertheless, their relationship was characterized
by a high degree of interdependence. As a psychiatrist's report
put it, "[ills ont tout simplement d6cid6 d'unir leurs forces,
chacun pouvant faire pour l'autre ce que l'autre lui-m~me est
incapable de faire., 75 The welfare authorities concluded that
Brunette was no longer entitled to benefits because her
relationship with Emard was marriage-like. The Quebec
administrative tribunal agreed:
Les faits en la prdsente instance am6ne le
Tribunal A conclure A l'existence entre les
requ6rants d'une vie affective, sans qu'il y ait
n6cessairement de rapports sexuels.
II existe entre les requ6rants une relation
privil6gi6e de confiance qui ne se retrouve que
dans une relation rdciproque stable dont les
personnes dependent Pun de l'autre dans leur
cheminement de vie.
Le Tribunal constate que la relation existante
entre les requ6rants ne correspond pas du tout
A celle d'un chambreur avec sa logeuse et qu'il
74 Brunette c. Quibec (Ministre de la Solidaritd sociale), [2000] R.J.Q.
2664 (C.S.), online: QL (JQ).
75 Ibid. at para. 31. Translation: "They simply decided to unite their
forces, each capable of doing for the other that which the other was
incapable of doing."
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est davantage assimilable A celle des personnes
vivant maritalement au sens de la loi.
76
This decision was reversed on appeal to the Superior Court.
Justice Julien argued that the finding of a marriage-like
relationship confronted Brunette with an impossible choice that
violated her human dignity. She could cease cohabiting with
itmard, in which case her benefits would be restored, but she
would have great difficulty residing in her own apartment and
could be forced to live in an institutional setting and thus
sacrifice some of her personal autonomy. Or, if she continued
to live with 1tmard in her home, she would lose her benefits
and thus her financial autonomy.77 The judge concluded that it
was possible to exclude from the definition of spouse a non-
sexual relationship founded on the respective needs of two
disabled co-residents: "I1 n'y a pas de vie maritale au sens
habituel du terme".7 8 In the result, the judge reasserted the
more traditional distinction between conjugal and non-conjugal
relationships, one that places great reliance on the existence of
a sexual relationship, an understanding that had been eroded by
the original denial of benefits to Brunette.
The denial of welfare assistance to Brunette because of
her relationship with Emard was insidious. But it is easy to see
how a functional equivalence approach, like the Molodowich
76 Ibid. at para. 32. Translation: "The facts of this case lead the Tribunal
to find affective ties between the applicants, even though there were
not sexual relations. The applicants had a special relationship of trust
that one finds only in a stable reciprocal relationship where persons
depend on each other in leading their lives. The Tribunal affirms that
the relationship existing between the applicants is not at all the same
as the relationship between a tenant and boarder and that it amounts
to a marriage-like relationship as understood by the law."
77 Ibid. at para. 66.
78 Ibid. at para. 64. Translation: "There is not a marriage-like
relationship as normally understood."
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approach affirmed by the Supreme Court in M v. H., can
produce such results. Since conjugal relationships can "vary
widely and almost infinitely", and need not have a sexual
component, on what basis can a highly interdependent
relationship like that between Brunette and timard be
excluded? And what if Brunette and timard did have a sexual
relationship? Then, presumably, the finding that they lived in a
marriage-like relationship would have been more difficult for
the court to avoid. Brunette probably would have lost her
benefits. Similarly, the termination of benefits would have
followed with no debate if she and ltmard had decided to
marry. Yet, the negative consequences for Brunette's financial
and personal autonomy - the denial of her human dignity, as
the judge put it - would have been no less severe if she and
Itmard were in a marital or marriage-like relationship. The
reasoning in Brunette recuperates sex as the crucial distinction
between conjugal and non-conjugal relationships. The result,
however, is a legal regime that appears to tolerate legal rules
that deny human dignity so long as it is only persons in
conjugal relationships that suffer.
In Falkiner v. Ontario,79 the applicants sought an order
declaring that the definition of spouse in Ontario's welfare
regulations is unconstitutional. The applicants were four
women who had been deemed to be living with "spouses" and
had thus been disentitled to social assistance. Each of the
applicants had been living with a man for less than a year.
None of the men were the fathers of the applicants' children,
and none of them had any legal obligation to support the
applicants or their children. A majority of the Ontario
Divisional Court concluded that the "spouse in the house" rule
constituted an unjustifiable violation of the equality rights of
79 Falkiner v. Ontario (Director, Income Maintenance Branch, Ministry
of Community and Social Services) (2000), 188 D.L.R. (4th) 52, 134
O.A.C. 324 (Ont. Gen. Div.), appeal heard and reserved by the
Ontario Court of Appeal on January 31, 2001.
What is Mariage-Like Like?
sole support parents on social assistance, the vast majority of
whom are women.
Like Justice Julien in Brunette, Justices Land and
Haley were troubled by the impact the "spouse in the house"
rule has on women's personal and financial autonomy. The
effect of the rule, they noted, is to force women to give up
either their relationships or their financial independence.80 "It is
hard to think of a more intrusive scheme", they said, "than to
force two persons sharing accommodation into an unwanted
economic relationship."81
Justices Land and Haley rejected the government's
arguments that the regulation was a legitimate attempt to
promote the formal equality of married couples and unmarried
conjugal couples. The problem with the regulation, in their
view, is that it "does not just treat common law couples the
same as married couples, but it catches a large number of
relationships which do not resemble marriage, where there is
no 'couple' and no 'family unit' involved. 812 The fact that
roommates who share nothing but accommodation could
become "spouses" within the meaning of the regulation, in the
majority's words, "makes nonsense of the claim that the
pressing concern on the part of the government is to ensure
equality between common law and married couples".8 3 As they
elaborated:
The Regulation captures as part of a "couple"
individuals who have not formed relationships
of such relative permanence as to be
comparable to marriage, whether formal or
80 Ibid. at 80 and 92.
81 Ibid. at 104.
82 Ibid. at 100.
83 Ibid. at 101.
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common law. It makes couples, or family
units, out of individuals like the Respondents
who have made no commitment to each other,
with accompanying voluntary assumption of
economic interdependence. There is all the
difference in the world between a person, with
her own money, sharing accommodation in the
hope that an inchoate relationship may
flourish, versus a person whose financial
support is largely in the hands of her
cohabitant who has no legal obligations
towards her and her children. As a functional
definition of a marriage-like relationship, the
Regulation is deeply flawed because it
assumes equivalency between a cohabitant
who has support obligations to the applicant or
recipient and one who does not.84
The majority thus struck down the definition of spouse
on the grounds that it was too broad. They sought to reassert a
stable distinction between conjugal and non-conjugal
cohabitants by narrowing the definition of spouse so that it that
did not threaten to absorb roommates and tentative new
relationships between lovers. The fatal flaw with the current
definition of spouse, in their analysis, is that it lacks a
durational requirement. It does not distinguish between "trial"
relationships and more enduring partnerships. By implication,
their ruling suggests that if the "spouse in the house" rule did
not take effect until after three years of cohabitation - that is, if
the definition of spouse mirrored the definition used for the
purposes of imposing spousal support obligations - then the
constitutional defect would be rectified. The majority judgment
thus does not condemn the use of conjugality to deny
entitlement to social assistance. Rather, it simply insists that the
84 Ibid. at 80.
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length of required conjugal cohabitation be the same as that
required in the definition of spouse used to impose support
obligations in family law. In other words, women can be forced
to be economically dependent on men, so long as the law offers
them the possibility of relief from that dependency if the
relationship breaks down.
The rulings in Brunette and Falkiner addressed the
injustices in the cases before them, but adopted solutions that
are too narrow. They seek to curb the expansion of spousal
definitions at their uncertain margins but leave the core of the
problem intact. The real problem is that the existence of a
domestic relationship, conjugal or otherwise, no matter how it
is defined, is not a reliable marker of reduced financial needs.
The effect of using conjugality in any form as a proxy for
reduced need is to deny low-income persons the choice of
forming economically independent relationships. 85 As Justice
85 The problems evident in Brunette and Falkiner are a recurring feature
of the administration of income security programs at the federal level
as well. For example, low-income taxpayers are at risk of being
denied the Canadian Child Tax Benefit and the Goods and Services
Tax Credit if they live in a conjugal relationship for a year or longer.
The income of a spouse or partner is considered in determining an
applicant's entitlement to these tax benefits, even if the parties have
agreed to remain economically independent: see the decisions of the
Tax Court of Canada denying benefits to women who had chosen to
remain financially independent from their partners in Sanford, supra
note 65; Lavoie, supra note 47; Poulter v. Canada (1995), 13 R.F.L.
(4e) 288 (T.C.C.), online: QL (TCJ); and Bolduc v. Canada, [1994]
T.C.J. No. 495 at para. 11 ("spouses living in a conjugal relationship
are treated in the same way as married spouses, and there is nothing
in the Income Tax Act permitting them to have agreements between
them that would prevent the Minister from applying the said
sections"). For a discussion, see I-A. Lahey, The Benefit/Penalty
Unit in Income Tax Policy: Diversity and Reform (Law Commission
of Canada, 2000) at 11-15, 107-111, online: Law Commission of
Canada website <http://www.lcc.gc.ca/en/themes/pr/cpra/lahey/index.
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Glube said in a Nova Scotia case, the assumption that conjugal
living results in an improved financial state "is truly outmoded
as it presumes that a man who marries or lives with a woman
will provide for her financially. It further presumes
dependency of the woman on the man . . [I]t is archaic to
assume one spouse will 'take care' of the other."86 Since
financial independence should be a choice that is not only
tolerated but encouraged, since the formation of interdependent
family units should also be encouraged, and since coerced
dependence is wrong, the existence of a conjugal relationship
should not, in itself, make any difference to welfare
entitlements. The flaw of "spouse in the house" rules is not
only that they rely on overly broad definitions of conjugality as
Brunette and Falkiner suggest, but that they treat the mere
existence of a co-residential relationship as a proxy for actual
income sharing.8
7
html> (last modified 31 January 2002). As Lahey states at 12,
"[r]ulings like Poulter leave low-income people with stark choices:
become factually dependent on a co-resident - even if they have
chosen to be financially autonomous - or give up the relationship."
86 Shephardv. Fancy (1997), 155 D.L.R. (4th) 680, (N.S. S.C.), online:
QL (NSJ) at para. 54.
87 This was the conclusion reached by Kelly J. in R. v. Rehberg (1994),
111 D.L.R. (4th) 336, 127 N.S.R. (2d) 331 (S.C.). In dismissing a
charge of welfare fraud against the accused based on her failure to
disclose that she was a cohabiting with a man, Kelly J. found that the
"spouse in the house" rule violated her constitutional equality rights.
The definition of spouse at issue, like the Ontario definition at issue
in Falkiner, required cohabitation in a conjugal relationship ("as
husband and wife") for an unspecified duration. Kelly J. condemned
the rule as "a disincentive to the formation of new families" and for
"encouraging a highly discretionary invasion of privacy" (at para. 48)
and suggested that welfare entitlement should not be based on
relational presumptions. Unfortunately, it appears that Kelly J.'s
well-considered analysis has had no impact on the administration of
"spouse in the house" rules in Nova Scotia: see Burroughsford v.
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Both Brunette and Falkiner, like M. v. H., raise
questions about the stability of the distinction between conjugal
and non-conjugal relationships. In M. v. H., the Supreme Court
said that the presence or absence of a sexual relationship
should not determine the issue of conjugality for the purposes
of spousal support obligations. In the social welfare context in
some jurisdictions, sexual criteria had already been removed by
statute or regulation. As sex has become immaterial to, or of
declining relevance in, the determination of spousal status,
legal decision-makers are troubled by the increasing instability
of the distinction between conjugal and non-conjugal
relationships. The courts in Brunette and Falkiner
acknowledged this problem, insofar as they both expressed
concern that current understandings of spouse could capture
individuals living in non-conjugal relationships. They sought to
reassert a more stable distinction by removing from the
category of spouse persons who have not lived together in
enduring sexual or romantic relationships.
V. MOVING BEYOND RELIANCE ON ASCRIBED
SPOUSAL STATUS
Our discussion has revealed that the current legal
understandings and uses of conjugality are deeply flawed.
Their administration involves serious invasions of privacy,
including examinations into the details of cohabitants' sexual
lives. The distinction between conjugal and non-conjugal
relationships is uncertain and unstable. Judicial efforts to shore
up the distinction through the functional equivalence approach
appear to plant the seeds of its demise. The reasons for
devoting so much effort to maintaining a collapsing distinction
are difficult to discern. We conclude that to ask whether a
conjugal or marriage-like relationship exists is quite simply to
Lynch, [1996] N.S.J. No. 334 (S.C.), aff'd Burroughsford v. Nova
Scotia (SocialAssistance Appeal Board), [1997] N.S.J. No. 30 (C.A.).
2001]
312 REVUE CANADIENNE DE DROIT FAMILIAL [Vol. 18
ask the wrong question. The existence of a marriage or
marriage-like relationship is rarely relevant to the attainment of
legislative objectives.
To correct Canadian laws' over-reliance on ascribed
conjugal status, we propose a number of directions for future
reform. First is the need to reconsider whether relationships are
even relevant to particular legislative objectives. For example,
as we have suggested above, relationships should not be treated
as automatically relevant to the objective of adjusting benefits
according to need that animates income security schemes.
Relationship status is simply a poor proxy for actual financial
needs. Since relationships may involve financial independence,
and since this is a choice that ought not to be denied by state
policy, relational presumptions should not be used to determine
entitlement.
There are, however, other contexts in which
relationships will continue to be relevant to legislative
objectives. For example, family laws providing rights to the
division of family property, possession of the family home, and
spousal support aim to provide an orderly and equitable
resolution of financial affairs on the breakdown of
interdependent relationships. Rather than relying solely on the
involuntary ascription of spousal or common law partner status
to extend these rights beyond marriage, legislatures should
expand opportunities for individuals to voluntarily assume
them. Removing legal barriers to same-sex marriage, as we
have argued elsewhere, is required by the prohibition on
discrimination against gays and lesbians. 88 To restrict same-sex
couples living in committed relationships to ascribed spousal or
partner status, with all of the resulting uncertainties, delays and
88 Cossman & Ryder, supra note 7 at 108-27. See also Beyond
Conjugality, supra note 3 at 123-31; B. MacDougall, "The
Celebration of the Same-Sex Marriage" (2000-2001) 32 Ottawa L.
Rev. 235.
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invasions of privacy, is to treat their relationships as less
worthy of respect.
Legislatures should also give consideration to enacting
domestic partnership schemes that would allow registrants to
voluntarily assume a range of legal rights and obligations.
Domestic partnerships or civil unions should not be considered
as a means of avoiding same-sex marriage, as has been the case
in the Nordic European countries, Vermont and Hawaii. For
many, the symbolic meanings and public affirmation that
accompanies marriage cannot be replaced. To offer same-sex
couples domestic partnership instead of marriage, then, even if
the legal consequences were the same, would not fully remove
discrimination. In our view, domestic partnerships should be
considered as a supplement to equal marriage, offering to
persons who cannot or do not want to marry - including non-
conjugal couples - the ability to formalize their relationships
through a public commitment and to voluntarily assume a
package of legal rights and obligations.89
If these first two directions of reform are followed -
the reliance on relationships eliminated where they are not
relevant to legislative objectives, and opportunities to
voluntarily assume rights and obligations expanded - the need
to rely on ascribed relational definitions will be diminished,
although not eliminated altogether. For example, it will still be
necessary to confer rights to property, support, death benefits
and pension survivors' benefits to prevent economic
exploitation in the lives of persons who have not formalized
their relationships. People who are economically vulnerable as
a result of their contributions to enduring domestic
89 For a discussion of domestic partnership regimes and the advantages
they offer relative to ascribed spousal status, see ibid. at 129-43;
Beyond Conjugality, supra note 3 at 117-122; N. LaViolette,
Registered Partnerships: A Model for Relationship Recognition
(Ottawa: Law Commission of Canada, 2001).
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relationships will not necessarily have taken steps to formalize
their relationships through either marriage or domestic
partnership. However, by removing notions of conjugality from
these definitions, legislators can save legal decision-makers
from having to embark on the elusive quest for marriage
equivalence. We believe that relational definitions should be
more carefully tailored to expressly incorporate the precise
functional attributes that are relevant to the particular
legislative objectives at issue.90 As Graycar and Millbank put
it, in summarizing the similar purposive approach that
animated law reform in New South Wales, "the kinds of
relationships that laws should regulate ought to depend upon
the purpose of the law in question. As these purposes vary, so
should the type of recognition and obligation." 91
90 At least some degree of precision is to be preferred, in our view, to
open-ended definitions of the relevant relationships. An example of
the latter can be found in British Columbia Law Institute, Report on
Recognition of Spousal and Family Status (Vancouver: BCLI, 1998),
online: British Columbia Law Institute website <http://www. bcli.org/
pages/projects/rrsfs/contents.html>. The Report recommended that
non-conjugal relationships be recognized if they involved a close
association that is the equivalent of "a family relationship" (at 32).
The Report made clear that the goal of this definition was to include
enduring relationships involving emotional and economical
interdependence, and to exclude roommates, boarders and live-in
employees (ibid.). However, the Report refrained from specifying
the distinguishing features of a family-like relationship on the
grounds that "discretion must play a large role" (at 24). While we
agree that flexibility and discretion must play large roles, there is
much to be said for structuring that discretion by focusing decision-
makers' attention on the relevant functional attributes. The exercise
of discretion needs to be anchored to considerations relevant to
particular legislative objectives. An open-ended functional
equivalence approach to "family" would give rise to the same quest
for an elusive ideal, and the drift from rationality, that has
characterized the Molodowich approach to conjugality.
91 Graycar & Millbank, supra note 65 at 260.
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In our view, the relationships that are relevant to state
policies will involve varying combinations of four criteria: co-
residence, duration, emotional interdependence, and economic
interdependence. Depending on the nature of the legislative
objective at issue, sometimes all four should be present in the
definition of included relationships. On other occasions
emotional or economic interdependence alone should suffice.
Consider, for example, section 61 of the Ontario Family Law
Act,92 a modernized wrongful death provision that enables
listed family members to bring a tort action to recover their
relational losses consequent upon the negligently caused death
or injury to a loved one. Damages may be awarded for their
pecuniary loss, including the loss of future emotional support
("guidance, care and companionship"). Since the objective of
this provision is to compensate for harm to an economically or
emotionally interdependent relationship, it follows that any
person who had a relationship characterized by economic
and/or emotional interdependence with the deceased or injured
person may have suffered a relevant loss and therefore should
be entitled to bring an action. Since all that is at stake is the
right to bring a civil action, where a loss of economic or
emotional support must be established by evidence on the
balance of probabilities, a broad relational definition - if one is
necessary at all - is appropriate. There is no need to include
conjugal, co-residential or durational requirements in the
definition of the relevant relationships. The current exclusion
of non-conjugal relationships (unless persons are related by ties
of blood or adoption) is inconsistent with the provision's
objective.
However, in the context of rights to family property and
support on the breakdown of relationships, there is good reason
to retain a durational requirement. These provisions respond to
economic disadvantages and expectations that form over the
92 R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, s. 61.
2001] 315
316 REVUE CANADIENNE DE DROIT FAMILIAL [Vol. 18
course of enduring interdependent domestic relationships. We
have argued that the combination of emotional and economic
interdependence should be salient factors, replacing the current
references to conjugality:
It is the combination of emotional intimacy
and economic partnership that creates the
unique vulnerability of spouses to harsh
consequences arising on the breakdown of a
lasting relationship. Emotional intimacy is
founded on the kinds of trust that tend to
prevent people from taking seriously the
possibility of economic deprivation if the
relationship falters. And a high degree of
economic interdependence potentially creates a
high degree of economic vulnerability.
93
Therefore, in our study on the spousal definitions in Ontario
family law, we suggested that the definition of "spouse" for the
purposes of family property rights should include "either of
two persons who have lived together in a relationship of
primary importance in each other's lives." We further
recommended that "live together" be defined as "living
together in an economic partnership whether within or outside
of marriage".94 While the language of this proposal could no
doubt be improved upon, we remain convinced that the
underlying focus on the combination of emotional and
economic interdependence is sound. Similar reforms, extending
property and support rights to persons in emotionally and
economically interdependent non-conjugal relationships, have
been adopted in the Australian Capital Territory (1994) and in
New South Wales (1999). In NSW, "domestic relationships"
include "a close personal relationship between two adult
93 Cossman & Ryder, supra note 1 at 82.
94 Ibid. at 83.
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persons, whether or not related by family, who are living
together, one or each of whom provides the other with
domestic support and personal care. '95 The one important
difference in the ACT definition, which otherwise uses similar
terminology, is that co-residence is not a requirement.96 In the
ACT and NSW reforms, rights were also extended to same-sex
couples. These jurisdictions have thus taken important steps
towards conjugal relational equality without ignoring the
interests of persons living in non-conjugal relationships.
95 New South Wales Property (Relationships) Act 1984, s. 5(1), online:
Australian Legal Information Institute website <http://www.austlii.
edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consol-act/pa1984298/s5.html>, as amended by
the Property (Relationships) Legislation Amendment Act 1999. An
excellent discussion of the legislation's genesis and its aims can be
found in Graycar & Millbank, supra note 65.
96 Australian Capital Territory, Domestic Relationships Act 1994, s.
3(1), online: Australian Legal Information Institute website <http:
//www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/act/consol_act/dra1994253/s3.html>
("domestic relationship" means "a personal relationship (other than a
legal marriage) between two adults in which one provides personal or
financial commitment and support of a domestic nature for the
material benefit of the other, and includes a de facto marriage" ). The
Nova Scotia Law Reform Commission favoured this language,
supplemented by durational and co-residential requirements, in its
report on family property: see Law Reform Commission of Nova
Scotia, Reform of the Law dealing with Matrimonial Property in
Nova Scotia: Final Report (Halifax: The Commission, 1997),
(recommending that family property rights apply to married persons
and "two adults in a personal relationship where one provides
personal or financial commitment and support of a domestic nature
for the benefit of the other, where the parties have cohabited for a
period of at least one year."). The Nova Scotia legislature opted
instead to extend support rights to conjugal cohabitants and property
rights to conjugal couples that choose to register as domestic partners:
see Law Reform (2000) Act, supra note 14.
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Extending family property and support rights to
persons in interdependent non-conjugal relationships could
disrupt expectations based on the current exclusion of those
relationships from legal rights and obligations. It would also
produce a new set of uncertainties regarding which
relationships would fall within the purview of the law. In
Canada, the disputes that now occur at the conjugal/non-
conjugal dividing line would not go away, they would just be
shifted to new terrain. Mindful of these difficulties, the Ontario
Law Reform Commission in 1993 recommended against
extending family rights and obligations to non-conjugal
relationships. If the law focused on the combination of
emotional intimacy and economic partnership, the Commission
commented, it would potentially apply "to many relationships
that are not currently within the purview of the Family Law
Act. It could conceivably apply, for example, to business
partnerships, as well as to relationships between parents and
their children, or between friends. 97
In our view, the concerns raised by the Commission
can be addressed without excluding non-conjugal relationships
entirely from the law. For example, a carefully drafted
definition could exclude business partnerships, either expressly
or by including language like the phrase "close personal
relationship" used in the NSW legislation. Relationships
between parents and their minor children could also be
expressly excluded. However, it is true, as the OLRC
suggested, that a new legal definition that focuses on emotional
intimacy and economic interdependency could well bring a
broad range of currently excluded adult personal relationships
within the law's purview. It could include, for example,
relationships between siblings, or parents and adult children, or
non-relatives who have lived together in interdependent, non-
sexual relationships for many years. These relationships likely
fall outside of the scope of the current definitions of spouse and
97 O.L.R.C., supra note 41 at 62.
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partner in most Canadian family law legislation. However, if
they have lived together in long-term relationships that involve
emotional and economic interdependence, then the objectives
of the legislation will be called into play when the relationships
break down. The current exclusion of persons in non-conjugal
relationships from statutory rights to property division,
possession of the family home, or support, is not consistent
with the legislative objectives.
We do not mean to suggest that non-conjugal
relationships can be easily or simply assimilated into existing
family laws that currently apply only to conjugal couples. A
presumption in favour of equal division of family property may
be inappropriate in the case of non-conjugal relationships.
Similarly, a needs-based conception of permanent support
obligations, like the conception of spousal support put forward
by the Supreme Court of Canada in Bracklow, 98 is premised on
the view that marriage entails the voluntary assumption of
support obligations "until death do us part". This conception of
spousal support arguably reflects a dated view of marriage. Its
application to non-conjugal cohabitants - and to unmarried
conjugal cohabitants for that matter - would be even more
questionable. However, a legislative property and support
regime founded on the objective of preventing exploitation by
compensating for the economic disadvantages attributable to
roles taken on during interdependent relationships can be justly
applied to both conjugal and non-conjugal cohabitants. For
example, the New South Wales Property (Relationships) Act
1984 empowers courts to make orders adjusting the property
rights of persons in domestic relationships where it is "just and
equitable" to do so in light of their respective contributions to
the value of their property or each other's welfare.99 Similarly,
courts can order maintenance where a party to a domestic
98 Supra note 23.
99 Supra note 95, s. 20.
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relationship is unable to support himself or herself adequately
because child-care responsibilities or other circumstances of
the relationship have adversely affected his or her earning
capacity.100 There are no automatic entitlements to property or
support. The legislation puts in place a flexible approach that
can respond to injustices arising on the termination of any
domestic relationship.
In a recent paper, Nicholas Bala and Rebecca Jaremko
Bromwich have defended the current blanket exclusion of non-
conjugal relationships from family property and support
laws.x1' They do agree with the need to reconsider the law's
focus on conjugality in many legal and policy contexts.
However, in the area of private rights and obligations imposed
by family law, they argue that conjugality is a clear and
important concept that should remain determinative. Conjugal
relationships, they suggest, are distinct because of the
commitments and expectations of permanence that accompany
them, and their role in providing stable family environments
for raising children. With respect, though, their argument
confuses conjugality with the relevant functional attributes that
often (but not always) accompany conjugal relationships.
Committed relationships that involve the raising of children or
the assumption of other caregiving or domestic roles may give
rise to expectations of continued support to which the law
should respond. But conjugal relationships do not always
embody these or other relevant qualitative attributes; nor are
they always absent from non-conjugal relationships.
100 Ibid., s. 27.
101 N. Bala & R. Jaremko Bromwich, "Context and Inclusivity in
Canada's Evolving Definition of the Family", forthcoming in (2002)
Int. J. of Law, Policy & the Family.
What is Marriage-Like Like?
As Justice McLachlin (as she then was) pointed out in
Miron v. Trudel, governments should frame legislation not by
reference to marital status, conjugality or marriage-
equivalence, but by reference to the functional attributes of
relationships that are relevant to the legislative objectives at
issue. In Miron, in devising legislation dealing with who should
be entitled to claim accident benefits pursuant to automobile
insurance policies, Justice McLachlin suggested that the
Ontario legislature had "misconstrued the issue as one of
marriage equivalence" when it ought to have identified "which
family units were so financially interdependent and stable as to
warrant provision of the benefits in question."102 As she
concluded,
If the issue had been viewed as a matter of
defining who should receive benefits on a basis
that is relevant to the goal or functional values
underlying the legislation, rather than marriage
equivalence, alternatives substantially less
invasive of Charter rights might have been
found.10
3
Bala and Jaremko Bromwich's analysis also
misconstrues the issue as one of conjugality or marriage-
equivalence. For example, they seem to suggest that it would
always be unfair and socially undesirable to impose support
obligations on an adult child living with an elderly parent.04
While this may be true most of the time, it would not be true if
the circumstances of the relationship gave rise to a reasonable
expectation of continued support and one party's earning
capacity was adversely affected by responsibilities undertaken
over the course of the relationship. The relevant functional
102 Supranote4 atpara. 169.
103 Ibid. at para. 170.
104 Bala & Jaremko Bromwich, supra note 101.
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consequences that often accompany conjugal relationships, and
sometimes accompany non-conjugal relationships, ought to be
the focus of legal definitions, not conjugality itself.
The above discussion is only a brief illustration of how
a purposive approach to relationship recognition would lead to
the consideration of innovative definitions that more precisely
articulated the functional attributes of relationships relevant to
particular legislative goals. 05 While the definitions would
differ in the details depending on the legislative objectives at
stake, they would share some common features: conjugality
would be displaced and an inquiry into sexual relations would
be irrelevant. Instead, legislative definitions of relationships
should focus on the combination of co-residence, duration,
emotional intimacy and economic interdependence that is
relevant to the achievement of the legislative objectives at
issue. We should emphasize that we do not believe that these
revised definitions will resolve all of the problems that arise
whenever the law imposes relational consequences on people
that they have not voluntarily assumed. Like any presumptive
or ascribed relational definitions, their administration would
involve uncertainties and invasions of privacy. The definitions
would continue to involve considerable discretion on the part
of legal decision-makers. These problems of the Molodowich
marriage-equivalence approach would not be left behind by the
purposive functional approach we have defended here. The
advantage of a purposive functional approach is that legislative
definitions would better focus discretion and provide a more
principled basis for considering whether particular adult
personal relationships should be included within particular
legislative schemes. Our point is that legal decision-makers
would at least be asking the right questions, rather than
embarking on the elusive quest for marriage-equivalence.
105 For a discussion of similar issues in the context of federal legislation,
see Beyond Conjugality, supra note 3, Chapter Three, "Reconsidering
the Relevance of Relationships".
What is Marriage-Like Like?
VI. CONCLUSION
When the federal bill extending rights and obligations to
conjugal partners"' was being debated in Parliament, members
of the Reform Party, the right wing opposition party, argued at
some length that the existence of a sexual relationship was an
inappropriate basis for the allocation of rights and
responsibilities. This argument was a thinly veiled effort to
oppose the extension of rights and responsibilities to same-sex
couples, particularly given the Reform Party's support for
limiting the definition of marriage to opposite-sex couples.
10 7
Nevertheless, the argument regarding the irrelevance of sex
does raise a serious question about the viability of the
distinction between conjugal and non-conjugal couples. Eric
Lowther, a Reform Party Member of Parliament, after speaking
at length about the importance of the traditional definition of
marriage and of promoting the institution of marriage, stated:
There are many types of gender relationships:
siblings, friends, roommates, partners, etcetera.
However, the only relationship the government
wants to include is when two people of the
same gender are involved in private sexual
activity, or what is more commonly known as
106 Modernization ofBenefits and Obligations Act, supra note 8.
107 Svend Robinson, MP makes this point in his comments on Second
Reading, "I would note as well that each and every one of those
members of parliament who is now speaking out against this bill is
saying that they should oppose this bill because it does not go far
enough, it does not recognize other dependent relationships like two
sisters living together or two elderly gentlemen sharing a home.
Without exception each and every one of those members has spoken
against basic equality for gay and lesbian people. That is their
agenda. They do not believe in it." House of Commons Debates (15
February 2000) at 1245 (S. Robinson).
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homosexuality. No sex and no benefits is the
government's approach to this bill. Even if
everything else is the same, even if there is a
long time cohabitation and dependency, if
there is no sex there are no benefits. Bill C-23
is a benefits for sex bill. It is crazy.
08
The Honourable Member misstated the scope of the Bill (which
extended benefits and obligations, to same-sex and opposite-
sex common law couples) and misrepresented the current test
for conjugality'0 9 (within which a sexual relationship is but one
relevant factor). However, his comments do capture the extent
to which in the public imagination, conjugality continues to be
associated with a sexual relationship, as well as the extent to
which the mere existence of a sexual relationship increasingly
seems to be an inappropriate marker for the extension of rights
and responsibilities.
Minister of Justice Anne McLellan defended the use of
conjugality to confer rights and obligations by stating that
"there is a qualitative difference between the relationships
addressed in Bill C-23 and the types of relationships that may
exist among relatives, siblings or friends living under the same
roof and sharing household expenses". 110 The Minister then
noted that adult Canadians who currently live in non-conjugal
interdependent relationships may welcome the extension of
benefits, but perhaps not the accompanying legal obligations,
and that this raises a series of important questions about how
these relationships of dependency ought to be recognized.
108 Ibid. at 1135-1140.
109 See Molodowich, supra note 19.
110 House of Commons Debates (15 February 2000) at 1110 (A.
McLellan).
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While the extension of legal rights and responsibilities
to non-conjugal cohabitants raises many difficult questions, our
analysis takes issue with the Minister's assertion that there is a
"qualitative difference" between conjugal and non-conjugal
relationships."' Rather, we have argued that the distinction is
elusive and increasingly difficult to maintain. Conjugal and
non-conjugal relationships may both be characterized by the
qualitative attributes of interdependence relevant to legislative
objectives. In common understandings and in many legal
decisions, the distinction ultimately rests on the presence of an
affective relationship with a sexual or romantic component. But
sex has declined in importance in legal understandings of
conjugality. For some time, sex has been treated as immaterial
to definitions of spouse in social welfare laws. As the Supreme
Court's ruling in M. v. H. 112 confirmed, sex is no longer
determinative of who is a spouse outside of the social welfare
context either. The functional equivalence understanding of
conjugality, which seeks to maintain the coherence of the
distinction, actually contains the seeds of its own destruction.
So long as the line between conjugal and non-conjugal
relationships is maintained in the law, some courts will likely
continue to reassert sex as a defining aspect of the distinction,
H The debates over Bill C-23 included a number of similar assertions.
For example, Svend Robinson stated, "I do not know if the
honourable member has brothers or sisters, but if he is suggesting that
his relationships with his brother or his sister is qualitatively the same
as his relationship with his wife, that is a ludicrous suggestion. We
can look at other relationships of dependency, but the fact of the
matter is that they are qualitatively different from the relationship that
gay or lesbian people have with their partners", ibid. at 1300. At the
same time, however, Robinson emphasized in his remarks that a
conjugal relationship is not simply defined by a sexual relationship,
and cited the test for conjugality set out by the Supreme Court of
Canada in Mv. H.
'12 Supra note 5.
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especially where it is desirable, as in Brunette,ll3 to limit the
insidious effects of laws that rely on unjust relational
presumptions.
We have argued that the question of whether a
relationship has a sexual component bears no connection to
legitimate state objectives. Once this is recognized, and sex is
removed from the scope of relational inquiries, the distinction
between conjugal and non-conjugal relationships collapses.
And we then need to develop better ways to determine when
and how the existence of an adult personal relationship is
relevant and should be recognized in law. The notion of
conjugality that currently determines the scope of application
of laws across the land requires legal decision-makers to focus
on the wrong question: what is marriage-like like? We have
suggested that this is an unanswerable question. Its pursuit
leads to incoherence in the application of legislative policies.
To redirect inquiries to the right questions, it is necessary to
reformulate relational definitions to focus more precisely on
the facts relevant to the objectives of particular legislative
schemes.
113 Supra note 74.
